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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
AMERICAN MANUFACTURERS MUTUAL, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, Respondent ) 
and Cross-Appellant, ) 
vs. 
RESORT CAMPERS LTD., DES 
TOWNSEND and GLEN HATCH, 
and 
Defendants and Cross-
Respondents, 
ROGER T. RUSSELL, TOM VOGEL, 
LEWID TED COWLEY, DALE CHRISTI-
ANSEN, JOHN H. WHITELEY, G~~N 
D. DAVIDSON and UNITED BANK, a 
Utah corporation, 
Defendants and 
Appellants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
~ ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case Nos. 18262 and 18263 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS RESORT CAMPERS LTD., 
DES TOWNSEND AND GLEN HATCH 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This proceeding was brought by plaintiff, American Manufacturers 
Mutual, the issuer of aonce-renewedmotor vehicle dealer's bond, 
against defendants, whom had made separate claims in separate 
actions against plaintiff, to obtain a declaratory judgment that 
plaintiff's total limit of liability to all claimants for all losses 
was limited to $20,000 and that plaintiff could extinguish its 
liability by depositing said sum with the Clerk of the Court. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Plaintiff American Manufacturers Mutual, hereinafter the 
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"bond company", by motion, successfully moved the trial in the 
instant declaratory judgment action into the trial setting which 
had been scheduled for the action filed earlier by defendants Des 
Townsend and Glen Hatch, the first of the defendants to obtain a 
trial setting, and obtained deferral of the Townsend-Hatch setting. 
In this action, tried by the Honorable Dean E. Conder on 
December 16 and 17, 1981, the lower court entered a declaratory 
judgment that the liability of the bond company was $20,000 as to 
all claims and losses arising between October 31, 1978 and October 31, 
1979, the period covered by the first bond premium, and $20,000 as 
to all claims and losses arising between October 31, 1979 and April 
13, 1980, the ·period covered- by the payment of a second bond premium 
to the effective date the bond was withdrawn. 
The court further ordered all cases filed by defendants 
consolidated so defendants' various claims could be determined and 
equitable proration of the bond amount could be made by the court. 
(R-237) 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants-Appellants Dale Christiansen and John W. Whiteley 
(represented by David K. Smith) and Roger T. Russell and Lewis Ted 
Cowley (represented by David M. Swope) joined on appeal by defendant 
United Bank (represented by Carl Kingston) and defendant-cross 
appellant Gwyn D. Davidson (represented by Bruce Findlay) all seek 
a judgment in this court that the bond company is liable to each 
separate claimant up to a maximum of $20,000 per claim. 
2 
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Plaintiff-cross-appellant bond company seeks a judgment in 
this court that its liability is limited to a maximum of $20,000 
regardless of the number of claimants, amount of claims or times 
the losses occurred or number of premiums paid. 
Defendants-cross-respondents Resort Campers Ltd., Des Townsend 
-and Glen Hatch agree with defendants that this court should determine 
that the liability of the bond company is $20,000 per claimant and, 
in addition, that if this court does not so rule that the declaratory 
judgment of the lower court that the liability of the bond company 
1s $20,000 per paid premium period should be affirmed. 
This brief, filed by defendants Resort Campers Ltd., Des Townsenc 
and Glen Hatch, responds to the bond company's brief and its cross 
appeal on the issue of whether the liability of the bond company 
is at least $20,000 per paid premium period. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendants Resort Campers Ltd., Des Townsend and Glen Hatch 
agree that some of the essential facts are set forth in the bond 
company's brief. However, that statement of facts is so interlaced 
with misleading, selfserving bond company contentions not found as 
facts by the trial court it is necessary to summarize other relevant 
evidence. 
A. Origin of the Subject Bond Form. 
Bond company agent Robert L. Blackham testified it was 
customary to use the dealer bond form which is the subject of this 
case, because the same had evidently been approved by the Attorney 
General. (R-320) The director of the Motor Vehicle Business 
3 
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Administration, John A. Burt, testified that the Motor. Vehicle 
Business Administration would accept whatever bond f~rm was approved 
by the Attorney General (R-359), and that any language changes of 
any sort, both those decreasing and those increasing the scope of 
the bond, would be rejected unless and until the same had been approved 
by the Attorney General. (R-372, 381) Former Attorney General Robert 
Hansen testified that he served as Attorney General from January 1977 
to January 1981 (R-438), and that he served in the office of the 
attorney general eight years before that time. (R-445). He had no 
specific recollection as to whether the bond form in question had 
been presented for evaluation or approval during his tenure in office 
(R-443) and could only say that, 1n general, the Attorney General's 
office would review forms to see if they complied with the particular 
statute in question, but that in less than one-half of one percent 
of the cases would the Attorney General's office do any drafting. 
(R-440) He indicated that it would be the general policy of the 
Attorney General's office to approve forms that would increase public 
protection beyond that required by a specific statute. (R-441) 
No conversations at all took place, much less any discussion 
of "intent of the parties" as to what the bond meant when Dick Noren 
and/or his wife Lavonne Noren applied for the bond. (R-295) Both the 
bond company and the Motor Vehicle Business Administration were 
permitted to partly testify and partly agree, over objection, with 
bond counsel's interpretation that the premiums only buy $20,000 
in protection and that the statute limits bond coverage to only 
4 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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$20,000, regardless of the number of claims or claimants or when 
claims arise. (R-344,371) 
B. ·Bond Company Ptactice 
About 1200 motor vehicle dealer bonds of the kind in 
question are issued or renewed for Utah motor vehicle dealers annually. 
(R-427) The premiums charged for these bonds are apparently determined 
on the basis of rates fixed by the Surety Association of America, a 
"rate fixing organization." (R-332, 344) The premium is $20.00 per 
$1,000 in bond coverage per annum. (R-343) The same premium is 
charged regardless of dealer volume. (R-388) [This results in 
annual premium revenue from Utah bonded dealers of approximately 
$480,000.00.] 
No bond claims losses are anticipated by the bonding companies 
who issue motor vehicle dealer bonds. (R~332, 344, 396) 
It is bond company practice to investigate dealer bond applicants 
and to require financial statements and information concerning the 
applicant's business reputation. (R~394, 411-12) This "underwriting 
file" is updated annually when renewal premiums are billed. (R-387, 
404-05, 408, 415-16) 
The bond company could have refused Noren's bond application 
had it determined him to be an unacceptable risk. (R-394) If 
financial--information shows insufficient liquid assets or insufficient 
net worth or an unfavorable Dun & Bradstreet report, the bond does 
not issue or 1s not renewed or is cancelled because the bond company 
does not accept any probability of loss. (R~338, 411-12) 
5 
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N.E.2d 617, 673 {Mass. 1973), a case cited by defendants in 
support of the Dobbs rule, in which the court actually declined 
to apply Dobbs. The court reasoned in part as follows: 
It might be appropriate for us to reconsider 
our present rule in the light of the New 
Jersey rule as laid down in the case of 
Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, supra, if 
we had before us a case involving a 
"substantial inequity of bargaining power, 
position or advantage between the broker and 
the other party involved." Perhaps such a 
case might be one involving a broker and a 
person selling his residence once in his 
lifetime and where the contracting buyer 
accepted by the seller is in fact not ready, 
able and willing to complete the purchase on 
the agreed date for conveyance. 
291 N.E.2d at 624. The Dobbs ruling conflicts with F.M.A. 
Financial Corp. v. Build, Inc., 17 Utah 2d 80, 404 P.2d 670 
(1965) discussed above, and plaintiff respectfully contends that 
Dobbs is not the law in Utah. 
It is clear from the decisions of the New Jersey courts that 
the Dobbs decision would not be applied by them in this case as 
proposed by defendants. In Kennedy v. Roach, 122 N.J. Super. 
361, 300 A.2d 570 (1973), sellers obtained a buyer for their 
motel through the broker, Kennedy, who agreed to take $3,000 of 
his commission down and the balance at a later time. Like the 
case at bar, the buyer paid a down payment and ~ent into 
possession, and then defaulted, and the buyer retook possession 
and retained the amount paid. The estate of the broker sued for 
the balance of the brokerage fees, and the defendants contended 
the commission was contingent upon the buyer's payment of further 
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commissions. The court said, in ordering judgment to enter as a 
matter of law for the broker and in reversing the trial court, 
that--
We are, of course, well aware of the landmark 
holding of Ellsworth Dobbs Inc. v. Johnson 
• • • 
However, Dobbs did not deal with a situation 
such as is here involved • • • 
Under the circumstances of this case we find 
no "inequality of bargaining power, position 
or advantage" between the broker and the 
seller, nor any inequity or unconscionability 
which militates against the entitlement of 
plaintiff to his $9,000 commission as of the 
time when the buyer went into possession and 
took over the operation of the motel, albeit 
payment of $6,000 thereof was to be deferred 
to September 15, 1970. 
Kennedy v. Roach, supra, at 571-72. Similarly, in the case at 
bar the parties dealt with one another voluntarily and in a 
commercial setting; the defendants had purchased the propety 
earlier in a transaction in which they dealt with the plaintiff. 
Plaintiff respectfully suggests, therefore, that the Dobbs rule 
would not be applied to this case even if it were subject to New 
Jersey law. 
Ferrara v. Firsching, 533 P.2d 1351 (Nev. 1975) does not aid 
defendants; like Real Estate Exchange v. Kingston, 18 Utah 2d 
254, 420 P.2d 117 (1966), it involved an explicit agreement that 
broke~'s commission was to be paid from purchase money as it was 
received. 
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Point IV 
The trial court properly found no material issue 
of fact in defendants claim that thev did not 
sign as individuals 
Defendants advance the proposition that the note is not 
integrated, and that therefore they are entitled to present 
extrinsic evidence to show that they did not sign it as 
individuals. As noted above, §70A-3~403 provides presumptively 
for liability of a representative on a note like the one in suit, 
and therefore it would seem that such evidence would not raise a 
material issue of fact. Defendants argue as also noted above 
that other documents involved in the sale of the Sa~dy Ranch seem 
in their view to support their claim that they did not sign as 
individuals. This argument cannot stand, however, since the note 
is plain. The rule is provided in 11 Am. Jur. 2d, Bills and 
Notes §726 that--
If an obliger understands, or should 
understand, the language and effect of a note 
when he signs it, and executes it willingly, 
without being seduced by the fraud of the 
obligee, he .ought not to be, and he is never, 
permitted to dispute or deny its obligation, 
according to its legal and rational 
construction. 
Ignorance of the contents of the agreement is similarly not 
a basis for attacking its clear meaning. In Garff Realty Co. v. 
Better Building, Inc., 120 Utah 344, 234 P.2d 842 (1951 ), the 
defendant's attorney had proposed a question to an officer of 
defendant whether the officer knew certain terms of the agreement 
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involved in suit when it was signed. Objection to this question 
was sustained, and the defense of the defendant that the officer 
was not aware of all the terms of the contract and "'~ l was not 
the intention of the defendant to become bound for the payment of 
any commission," was held to be insufficient to state a defense. 
The court adopted the following reasoning: 
To permit a party, when sued on a written 
contract, to admit that he signed it but to 
deny that it expresses the agreement he made 
or to allow him to admit that he signed it 
but did not read it or know its stipulations 
would absolutely destroy the value of all 
contracts. 
234 P.2d at 844. The court observed further that there were no 
issues of fraud or mutual mistake raised, as none have been in 
the case at bar, (Minute Entry, Record at 100), and therefore the 
court sustained a directed verdict. 
The Federal District Court for the District of Utah has 
granted summary judgment over similar objections in E.F. Hutton 
and Co., Inc. v. Schank, 456 F. Supp. 507 (D. Utah 1976), where 
the plaintiff securities broker sought to enforce an arbitration 
clause in a contract between the securities broker and its 
customer, the customer claiming that its attention had been 
distracted from this clause by an inadequate presentation f the 
contract's meaning and that therefore the contract was invalid. 
The court observed that the mistake, if any had occurred, had 
been solely that of defendant and was not mutual, and that 
because the plaintiff's agent had informed defendant that the 
contract was for the good of plaintiff there had been no 
unilateral mistake either, and that the signature was genuine, 
-22-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and therefore summary judgment should enter enforci~g the 
arbitration clause. 
The defense that the defendants had not signed the note in 
their individual capacities was not raised in the case at bar 
until after plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was on file 
and until after the plaintiff had taken the deposition of 
defendant Robert S. Nielson, relying in taking that deposition on 
the state of the pleadings as a guide to the scope of the issues 
in the suit. This claim was not alleged in the answer, nor was 
it based on any facts not in possession of the defendants at the 
time of filing the answer. In these circumstances the discretion 
of the court to deny defendants the right to raise this issue by 
amendment was properly exercised. See, Dupler vs. Yates, 20 Utah 
2d 251, 351 P.2d 624 (1960)(liberality of rule permitting 
amendment to pleadings "not without limit"); Bradford v. Alvey & 
Sons, 621 P.2d 1240 (Utah, 1980)("Such an amendment [to conform 
pleadings to evidence] should be allowed by the court only when 
it will serve the purpose of the rule, which is to further the 
interests of justice •.• More importantly, there is nothing in 
the record, nor in the facts as viewed by the trial court, which 
would provide a basis upon which the defendants should be 
es topped • • • " ) 
Thus the trial judge ruled correctly when he said--
In this matter the court finds that there are 
no facts alleged by defendants from which the 
court could conclude that the note upon which 
plaintiff brings suit is unclear, ambiguous, 
or was procured by fraud, duress or undue 
influence. It is the further finding of this 
court that there are no facts in dispute 
relating to the genuineness of the document 
-23-
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and the signatures being that of the parties 
who they represent. Accordingly the court 
finds that the note speaks for itself and 
that there is no basis to allow parole 
evidence to alter the face of the instrument 
• • • 
(Record at 100) 
Point V 
There was no condition in the obligation of defendants 
to pay the note or of N-Bar to pay broker's fees 
The most troubling thing about the claim of defendants that 
there is a condition in their obligation to pay under the note is 
that it is inconsistent with the documents produced by them as 
extrinsic evidence of the claimed condition. The brokerage 
contract provides for no extension of time or condition, the note 
is unconditional, the escrow agreement expresses no condition, 
and the other documents are relevant only to establish that 
plaintiff did in fact earn its commission by obtaining a binding 
contract of sale for N-Bar Corporation. Thus the claim t~at 
there was a condition appears to be more a belated and unilateral 
proposal from defendants designed to meet the exigencies of 
litigation that to describe fairly the state of the contract. 
The cases proposed by defendants to support the proposition 
that they should be permitted to prove a condition are not 
persuasive on this issue. Ventures, Inc., v. Jones, 101 Idaho 
837, 623 P.2d 145 (1981 ), for example, involved six promissory 
notes which were given as interim security and which were 
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replaced by a mortgage intended as permanent security. The court 
said--
Based upon its findings showing the 
circumstances of the note transaction and the 
close involvement of all the parties 
concerned, the district court concluded that 
the notes had been given and received for the 
special purpose of interim security and were 
to serve only a additional security until 
substitute security could be provided in the 
form of a mortgage from appellant. 
Id. at 150. The analogy of Ventures to the case at bar would be 
sound if for example the corporation seller, N-Bar Corporation, 
had paid plaintiff all its broker's fees and then plaintiff had 
brought suit upon the note. In such a situation the liability on 
the note would of course be extinguished. Here, however, N-Bar 
Corporation has not performed; it might be said on plaintiff's 
behalf that the contingency against which the note was· obtained 
has indeed been realized and now plaintiff is seeking to obtain 
the broker's fees under the note, exactly what was intended when 
it obtained the individual signatures of the defendants. 
Furthermore, defendants have presented the extrinsic evidence 
they propose in opposition to summary judgment, as required by 
Rule 56, and a perusal of it shows that defendants seek not to 
prove that the mutually agreed purpose of the note was subject to 
a condition, but that they will now testify that their implicit 
and unrevealed intention at the time was in conflict with the 
plain legal meaning of the note, and that therefore they should 
be exonerated. 
Another case cited by defendants, Aird Insurance Agency v. 
Zion's First National Bank, 612 P.2d 341 (Utah 1980) does not 
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support the relief they seek herein. The plaintiff Aird knew 
that Fitzen had a deposit at Zion's which had been pledged to 
Transamerica to secure a contractor's bond. This assignment was 
absolute in form, but was intended for security, and at the time 
of the events pertinent to the case, the bond had been satisfied 
by the completion of the contractor's project and Transamerica 
had concluded for its own internal purposes that it had no 
further claim upon the bank deposit. Nevertheless, Aird, which 
had a judgment against Fitzen, garnished Transamerica and 
obtained an assignment of the bank deposit, represented by a 
passboo'k. In the meantime, the defendant Zion's Bank had 
depleted the account to set off against against a debt owed to it 
by Fitzen, and Aird sued to compel the bank to reverse the setoff 
and give Aird the money which had originally been in the account 
The court looked behind the exact wording of the assignment 
to the understanding of the parties, which was that the 
assignment would have no more force once the contract protected 
by the bond was satisfactorily completed. Under these facts the 
assignment was deemed to have expired and lost its force. The 
court permitted proof of these facts and made the following 
observation: 
Satisfaction of an obligation secured by a 
pledge terminates, as a matter of law, the 
pledgee's rights in the collateral. Such 
termination is inherent in the definition of 
a security interest. Transamerica's interest 
having terminated before Fitzen ever 
defaulted on his loan, defendant moved 
against funds in the account now solely owned 
by ~itzen, Transamerica merely holding the 
account passbook without right, which might 
be likened to a constructive trust. 
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Id. at 344. The point here is that in the case at bar defendant 
has not raised a material issue of fact supporting a defense oE 
the type discussed in either Ventures or Aird; there is no 
evidence proffered of a mutual agreement that the note would be 
conditional or that defendants would not be individually liable, 
nor is there a showing of discharge of the underlying obligation, 
and thus there is nothing to· overcome plaintiff's prirna facie 
case on the note. 
This mutuality of understanding is crucial to defendants' 
case and the lack of it is fatal. Therefore defendants obtain no 
assistance from FMA Financial Corp. v. Hansen Dairy, Inc., 617 
P.2d 327 (Utah 1980), a case cited by them to support the claim 
that the note was conditional. FMA agreed to lease some 
equipment, including a silo for corn, to Hansen Dairy, which took 
the lease which the reservation that the silo had to be in place 
for the current year's harvest. The court said--
Significantly, the court found that there was 
no contact directly between the plaintiff and 
the defendants, "but all of the dealings were 
done by or through the Levies." Thus, a key 
proposition to be borne in mind as bearing on 
all of the issues in this case is that Mr. 
Mayme, acting for the plaintiff, entrusted 
the handling of its interests in this 
transaction to Mr. Levie. Consequently, his 
knowledge in that regard should be imputed to 
it. 
Id. at 329-330. Levie testified that he had understood the 
contract to require the silo to be in place for the current year, 
corroborating the testimony of Hansen Dairy, and the court then 
concluded that there had been an agreement that the lease would 
not go into effect if the~ silo was not installed in time, and 
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when it was not, the court released Hansen Dairy from the lease. 
The role of Levie as representative of FMA supplied the element 
of mutuality to the claim of Hansen Dairy that there was an 
agreement precedent to the lease, because through Levie th~ 
plaintiff FMA knew of and assented to the condition that the silo 
be furnished before the harvest began and also through Levie the 
plaintiff knew that the silo was not finished at the time the 
original lease was signed. 
In the case at bar, however, the defendants make no showing 
of mutuality in their claim that the note was subject to a 
condition and they point to no facts which would establish that 
there was any agreement establishing a condition; their defense 
rests upon their unsupported assertion that there was such an 
intent in their mind. Plaintiff respectfully urges that this 
claim fails to overcome the prima facie case established on the 
note and that therefore the judgment should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
This is not a case in which there is disagreement about what 
happened. After listening to his attorney take the deposition of 
Kathleen Bagley, the defendant Robert s. Nielson gave the 
following answer: 
Q: (Mr. Findlay) You were here at the 
deposition, during Mrs. Bagley's deposition? 
A: (Mr. Nielson) I did. 
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Q: Are there any points in her deposition 
that come to mind that you differ with her? 
A: No. 
(Nielson deposition at 3) What is at issue in the within matter 
is the application of law to the facts presented. 
Plaintiff submits that the law is as follows: 1) the 
Uniform Commercial Code requires that a signer of a negotiable 
instrument is liable individually upon an instrument which does 
not bear the name of a person whom the signer allegedly 
represents as an agent; 2) Under the contract for brokerage in 
this case, the broker's fee was earned upon the sale, and the 
acceptance of the buyer by the seller waived any question as to 
his ability, and 3) the law does not imply a condition that a 
buyer will finish all payment of installments on· a purchase 
contract before the seller is required to pay broker's fees; this 
requirement would force brokers to insist upon payment in full at 
closing in every case, and would be to the disadvantage of 
sellers in general. 
In view of the record and the foregoing proposi~ions of law 
plaintiff urges the co~rt to conclude that the court below 
properly entered summary judgment and to affirm. 
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Respectfully submitted, 
Bruce Findlay 
Dan S. Bushnell 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL 
Plaintiff's attorneys 
330 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 521-3680 
SERVED two copies of the foregoing brief by mail this 
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